[Verse 1] Sarah's team ships fast with packages galore Pulling from registries they've used before But lurking in the shadows of their trusted code A poisoned dependency starts to erode The maintainer's account got compromised last week Now malicious commits make systems leak [Chorus] Check your deps, verify the source Trust but validate with cyber force Package registry, build pipeline too Every link can betray me and you Supply chain attacks come from within Where dependencies let the danger in [Verse 2] Open source maintainer seemed legitimate Years of contributions, reputation fit But deep inside their heart was a darker plan Backdoors planted by a foreign hand The typosquatting trap with similar names Developers install and feed the flames [Chorus] Check your deps, verify the source Trust but validate with cyber force Package registry, build pipeline too Every link can betray me and you Supply chain attacks come from within Where dependencies let the danger in [Bridge] Build systems compromised from the inside Continuous integration tools that hide Malicious scripts in the deployment stage Secrets stolen from the CI cage Third party services you thought were clean Become the gateway to your machine [Verse 3] Certificate authorities under attack Signing malicious code to cover their track Container images with hidden surprise Trojans embedded in familiar disguise The software bill of materials you must maintain To track every component in your domain [Chorus] Check your deps, verify the source Trust but validate with cyber force Package registry, build pipeline too Every link can betray me and you Supply chain attacks come from within Where dependencies let the danger in [Outro] Pin your versions, scan for threats Monitor the code that your pipeline gets Supply chain security starts with you Verify each link in all you do
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